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LITIGATING POLICE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS
IN NORTH CAROLINA
PROFESSOR IRVING JOYNERt
I. INTRODUCTION
Police misconduct actions are designed to address grievances that citi-
zens have against police officers for violating their constitutional rights or
rights secured by federal statutes. Police misconduct litigation, however,
is not the simplest area of constitutional or criminal law in which to
practice. There are many pitfalls which an attorney may encounter and
must avoid. Some of the pitfalls are caused by the victim, while others
are created by the defendant and the nature of the litigation.
Perhaps the more predominant problem in police misconduct litigation
is the adverse impact created by the victim's character. In too many
instances, the victim of police misconduct is an individual who has an
extensive criminal record or who is a suspect in illegal or questionable
activities. This dilemma is to be expected since police misconduct cases
arise most often from conflicts between the police and persons suspected
of criminal activities. Some victims of police misconduct, however, are
persons with outstanding backgrounds and credentials who simply have
had the misfortune of having a conflict or disagreement with overzealous,
brutal or sadistic police officers. The problem associated with the intro-
duction of bad character evidence of the victim should not distract from
the attorney's task of zealously and competently representing victims of
police misconduct.
Blacks and other minorities are especially vulnerable to acts of police
misconduct because of the widely held perception that some minorities
are more likely to be involved in criminal activities. Although all cases
of police misconduct do not involve persons of a particular racial or eth-
nic background, history has shown that Blacks and other minorities are
more apt to be victims of police violence. Yet, Whites, women and gays
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are also victimized particularly if they advocate unpopular causes or
political points of view. The reasons for the misconduct make little dif-
ference. The crucial point is that those persons who are sworn and paid
to protect all citizens are sometimes the perpetrators of violence against
specific segments of the population.
The difficult task of litigating police misconduct claims is exacerbated
by court protection of police officers. Historically, police officers have
been expected to maintain and enforce the prevailing social order. In
short, their job is to keep the peace, to arrest suspected wrongdoers and
to prevent criminal activities. The judicial protection afforded police of-
ficers is based on the presumption that the use of force is necessary to
maintain social order and to apprehend persons suspected of committing
crimes.
More often than not, citizens will believe that the actions of police
officers were appropriate, lawful and necessary under the circumstances.
As a result of these presumptions, it is extremely difficult to convince a
jury of twelve citizens that police officers have violated the rights of
others.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1871
Known originally as the Ku Klux Klan Act, the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was enacted to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. The Act established both civil and
criminal penalties where deprivation of rights occurred under color of
law. In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress stated its resolve
to protect the rights of all people under the Constitution.
A. 42 US. C. 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.'
Section 1983 is meant to be broad reaching. Any allegation of facts
constituting a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment under color of law or state authority meets the requirements of
section 1983.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape,2 section 1983
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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actions have emerged as the primary statutory basis for actions seeking
to remedy police abuse. Section 1983 actions can be brought in federal as
well as state court.' Both courts are required to fully adjudicate the
claims of victims and to punish the wrongdoer if the jury determines that
the defendant has violated the constitutional and/or statutory rights of
the victim.
If a deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be shown, there is no
coverage under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. It is important to note that every
illegal act by a police officer constituting a tort under state law does not
necessarily establish a federal cause of action for violation of civil rights
under section 1983. An example would be a simple assault and battery
by a police officer against a citizen. Unless the assault and battery rises
to the level of a constitutional violation, a claim to redress that grievance
must be brought in state court. Another example is a police officer who
negligently performs his duties and the negligent conduct causes some
harm to the victim. In such a case, a section 1983 action is not necessar-
ily authorized.4 In order to prevail under section 1983, the victim must
prove that the act of the police officer amounted to more than mere negli-
gence. There must be proof that the officer intended to commit an act
that results in the harm to the victim. The key requirements of a section
1983 action are that the offending officer must have acted under color of
state law and that he caused an injury to the defendant's constitutional or
federal rights. It is not necessary that the officer acted with a specific
intent to violate the constitutional or statutory right but only that the
intended harm resulted in the violation of the constitutional or statutory
right of the victim.5
Section 1983 actions usually involve claims that either the first, fourth,
fifth, sixth, eighth or fourteenth amendments of the United States Consti-
tution were violated. Each constitutional violation carries a different
standard of proof, and it, is essential that plaintiff's attorney specifically
spell out the constitutional claim and theory so that the court can prop-
erly charge the jury.
In addition to the constitutional claims, various statutory claims can
be raised under section 1983. Where actionable constitutional claims are
involved, the victim's attorney may also bring pendant state tort claims.
An example involves the typical situation where a citizen is beaten by a
3. See, Snuggs v. Stanly County Dep't. of Pub. Health, 310 N.C. 739, 314 S.E.2d 528 (1984)
(state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also
Truesdale v. University of North Carolina, 91 N.C. App. 186, 371 S.E.2d 503 (1988) (state court
may grant injunctive relief for violations under § 1983).
4. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (negligent loss of mail did not violate 42
U.S.C. § 1983); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (prisoner could not claim under
§ 1983 for negligent medical treatment).
5. See, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (one is responsible for the natural consequences
of one's acts).
1991]
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police officer and wrongfully arrested. Under the constitutional stan-
dard, claims under the fourth and eighth amendments are possible.
Under state tort law, claims of assault and battery, wrongful arrest and
malicious prosecution may also be available to the victim. These tort
actions are inextricably linked to the constitutional claims but also estab-
lish separate tort claims that "but for" the constitutional claims could
not be raised in a section 1983 action in federal court. It is the attorney's
responsibility to clearly enumerate each constitutional, statutory and
state law claim that arises from the illegal conduct of the officer.
Constitutional deprivations must be alleged if section 1983 is to apply.
If the violation does not constitute a "deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,"6 the litigant
must choose another forum in which to seek redress.
The claimed deprivation under section 1983 must also be committed
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
state or territory or of the District of Columbia. "Under color of law" is
generally understood to mean acting under the authority of the state or
at its direction. The person violating the constitutional right need not be
a governmental official if the individual is acting under or at the direction
of a government official.7 Acts committed by a police officer, while func-
tioning in that capacity, are committed under color of law. "Misuse of
power, possessed by the virtue of state law and made possible only be-
cause the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action
taken 'under color of' state law."' 8 An off-duty police officer may, under
certain circumstances, act under color of law. 9
Although most police misconduct cases are brought under section
1983, persons who have suffered harm at the hands of law enforcement
officials may use other provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
B. 42 U.S.C. section 1981 provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Adicks v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (white woman in company of
black students denied service in restaurant); see also Smith v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 519 F.2d 93
(5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs were wrongfully detained and charged with shoplifting by store
employees).
8. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (citations omitted).
9. See, e.g., Belcher v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118 (1976) (off-duty officer shot and killed bar pa-
trons); Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (status of being on duty or off-duty
does not determine whether the officer has acted under color of law).
4
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In order to state a claim under section 1981, the plaintiff must allege
that he was the victim of racial discrimination." Section 1981 requires a
showing that the officer's wrongful conduct was motivated by impermis-
sible racial considerations and an intent to discriminate."I
C. 42 US. C. section 1985 allows a private cause of action for
conspiracies to violate constitutional rights and provides:
(1) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent,
by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding
any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from
discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of
the United States to leave any State, district, or place where his duties as
an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or
property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or
while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so
as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his
official duties;
(2) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter,
by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the
United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter
pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or
witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or
testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any
grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his per-
son or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment
lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or
if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering,
obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any
State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection
of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or
attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the
equal protection of the laws;
(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the consti-
tuted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or
if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or
threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his sup-
port or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of
10. See, e.g., Masel v. Industrial Comm'n, 541 F. Supp. 342, 344 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
11. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982); see
also Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1438 (9th Cir. 1984).
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any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice Presi-
dent, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any
citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in
any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or depriva-
tion, against any one or more of the conspirators. 2
To allege a violation of section 1985, the plaintiff must satisfy four
elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either di-
rectly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3)
an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States.13 The conspiracy must have as its purpose
the deprivation of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws, but there must also be motivation by "some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus behind the conspirators' action." 4
If more than one officer is involved in the incident, the plaintiff's attor-
ney should consider raising a violation of section 1985 conspiracy claim
in the complaint. In doing so, it is important to understand what facts
must be presented in order to state a colorable claim that a conspiracy
exists. If a conspiracy is alleged, the plaintiff must present facts that
show an agreement between two or more persons to commit harm to the
plaintiff and that an overt act was committed by one of the defendants in
furtherance of that conspiracy. 5 The mere presence of another officer at
the scene is not sufficient to make out a conspiracy.6
The attorney should carefully consider all available facts when assess-
ing the appropriate civil rights sections to be raised in the complaint.
The complaint should raise every possible claim. If the claims are not
raised in the complaint, the cause of action is waived. While it is possi-
ble, under some circumstances, to amend a complaint at a later date, the
better practice is to initially allege each possible claim. Initially alleging
the claim gives the defense attorney the burden of researching the law
and arguing motions to dismiss the claim rather than having plaintiff's
attorney attempt to convince a judge that there is a sufficient justification
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988).
13. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
14. Id.
15. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979).
16. See Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
6
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to amend the complaint at some later point after the statute of limitation
has expired.
The plaintiff's discovery focus is shaped by the legal claims raised in
the complaint. Discovery will reveal whether plaintiff has sufficient evi-
dence to survive a motion for summary judgment; however, that issue is
moot if the cause of action has been dismissed because of an insufficiency
in the pleading.
III. JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional basis to support plaintiff's causes of action must be
specifically stated in the federal complaint; failure to include a proper
jurisdictional statement will be fatal to the plaintiff's case. It is not nec-
essary to exhaust either state or administrative remedies prior to filing
an action under the Civil Rights Act. A state requirement that citizens
file a notice-of-claim with an administrative agency does not bar civil
rights claims in federal or state court.17 A plaintiff cannot be forced to
litigate civil rights claims in state court merely because state law provides
the same cause of action, unless the claims are not of constitutional
magnitude. "
A. Jurisdictional Statutes
1. Section 1343
(a). The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because
of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in
section 1985 of Title 42;
(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid
in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he
had knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immu-
nity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the
right to vote.
(b). For purposes of this section-
17. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140 (1988).
18. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
1991]
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(1) The District of Columbia shall be considered to be a State; and
(2) [A]ny Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Co-
lumbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.19
2. Section 1331. Federal Question; Amount in Controversy; Costs.
a. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.20
3. Section 1332.
(a). The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between -
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a for-
eign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
(b). Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a stat-
ute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally
in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than
the sum or value of $50,000, computed without regard to any setoff or
counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and
exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the
plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.
(c). For the purpose of this section and section 1441 of this title .... a
corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business,
except that in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract
of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which
action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be
deemed a citizen of the State of which the insurer is a citizen, as well as of
any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State
where it has its principal place of business[.]
(d). The word "States", as used in this section, includes the Territories,
the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 21
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
8
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IV. CAUSES OF ACTION
A. False Arrest and Detention
A claim that a person has been wrongfully arrested and detained is
actionable under section 1983 and is a violation of the fourth and four-
teenth amendments. For a false arrest to be actionable under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments, the plaintiff must show a warrantless arrest
without probable cause. 22 If a warrant was issued by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate prior to the arrest, probable cause is generally not at
issue, and a constitutional violation does not exist.23 If the magistrate's
determination that probable cause existed was incorrect, however, a
cause of action for false arrest may lie, but the officer's action will proba-
bly be justified by "good faith immunity. ' 24 A police officer can be held
liable in a civil rights action where he has altered an otherwise valid
arrest warrant, and that act results in the illegal arrest of a third party.25
Usually, false arrest, and false imprisonment and detention are state
law torts. Plaintiff's attorney should always raise every state law tort in
the complaint as a pendant claim. An action lies in North Carolina for
false arrest, or for false imprisonment and detention if there is an illegal
arrest by a law enforcement officer.26
The fourth amendment prohibits the arrest of a citizen by a police
officer without a warrant or without probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the person seized has committed that
crime. For fourth amendment purposes, a seizure occurs when an officer
restrains the freedom of a person to walk away.27
B. Use of Excessive Force
A police officer's excessive use of force where the officer is exercising
his authority gives rise to a cause of action under section 1983. The ex-
cessive use of force may violate fourth, eighth and fourteenth amendment
rights and also contravene North Carolina General Statute section 15A-
401(d) (1988).
22. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
23. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (arrest pursuant to mistaken identity).
24. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (search pursuant to facially valid but defec-
tive warrant).
25. Compare Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1989) (officer altered the name and other
information on the warrant resulting in wrongful arrest) with Baker, 443 U.S. 137 (wrong name on
the warrant due to mistaken identity).
26. See Melton v. Rickman, 225 N.C. 700, 36 S.E.2d 276 (1946); Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C.
App. 209, 371 S.E.2d 492 (1988); Robinson v. City of Winston-Salem, 34 N.C. App. 401, 238 S.E.2d
628 (1977).
27. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); accord Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
1991]
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Under the eighth and fourteenth amendments, excessive force means
force that is so disproportionate to the need presented and so inspired by
malice or sadism as to shock the conscience of the court.2" Courts have
made it clear that officers are privileged to use a certain degree of force to
arrest suspects and to prevent their escape.29 To find an officer liable for
excessive use of force, the force used must have exceeded the bounds of
the privilege.
The United States Supreme Court held in Graham v. Conner,30 that a
civil rights plaintiff in a fourth amendment excessive force claim does not
have to prove that the conduct was carried out "maliciously and sadisti-
cally for the very purpose of causing harm."'" Excessive force claims
brought under the eighth amendment are governed by the more difficult
cruel and unusual standard, but fourth amendment claims involving ex-
cessive or deadly force are to be analyzed under the "reasonableness"
standard.32
A different standard exists for liability under the fourth amendment.
The use of excessive force by an officer must be viewed as an assault upon
the person and, as such, implicates the fourth amendment. Under the
fourth amendment, the plaintiff is required to show that the force used
exceeded that which was reasonably necessary under the circum-
stances.33 What is reasonably necessary under the circumstances is a
jury question, which should be easier to prove than the "shocking the
conscience" standard of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is "rea-
sonable" under the Fourth Amendment requires a balancing of 'the na-
ture and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake....
Because 'the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application, . . . however, its
proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at is-
sue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight'.34
The state law tort of assault on the other hand and prohibition on the
use of force as specified in section 15A-401(d), require that the force used
by the police officer cannot exceed the force felt by an officer to be rea-
28. See King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1980); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228
(4th Cir. 1970).
29. See, e.g., Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573, reh'g denied, 802 F.2d 1486 (4th Cir. 1988).
30. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
31. Id. at 397.
32. Id. at 394.
33. Id. at 397.
34. Id. at 396. See also Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
10
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sonably necessary under the circumstances. This subjective test focuses
on the mind-set of the officer rather than on an objective test that is used
under the fourth amendment analysis. While the use of force to arrest is
allowed in North Carolina, willful, malicious, or criminally negligent
conduct or unreasonable force is prohibited. 3
A police officer in North Carolina cannot be held liable for assault
damages where he acted in substantial conformity with prescribed proce-
dure if there is no evidence of undue force.36 If the officer acts mali-
ciously in wantonly abusing his authority or by using unnecessary and
excessive force, a proper cause of action exists. 37
The legality of the arrest is not at issue in an excessive force claim.
38
An illegal arrest may make an excessive force claim stronger, but the
focus of the claim is that more force was used to arrest or restrain the
plaintiff than was necessary under the circumstances. If force is not nec-
essary to make an arrest, any force used by the officer is excessive. 39 The
state law claim should always be raised by the plaintiff's attorney.
C. Use of Deadly Force
The illegal use of deadly force by a police officer against a citizen is
actionable under section 1983 as a violation of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. In Tennessee v. Garner,' the United States Supreme
Court declared that the use of deadly force to apprehend an unarmed,
fleeing felon violated the decedent's fourth and fourteenth amendment
rights.4" The Court held that deadly force could only be used by police
when the life or safety of the officer or an innocent third party was in
immediate danger.
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects,
whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not
better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the sus-
pect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the
harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of
deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is
in sight escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a
little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect. A police
officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him
35. 490 U.S. 386. See also Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 299, 371 S.E.2d 492 (1988).
36. See Perry v. Hurdle, 229 N.C. 216, 49 S.E.2d 400 (1948).
37. See Todd v. Creech, 23 N.C. App. 537, 209 S.E.2d 293, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 341, 211
S.E.2d 216 (1974).
38. See Ridley v. Leavitt, 631 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1980).
39. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 774 F.2d 1495 (1 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
I115 (1986).
40. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
41. Id. at 21.
1991]
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dead.42
North Carolina law provides that an officer is justified in using deadly
physical force when it appears to be reasonably necessary to (1) defend
himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use
or imminent use of deadly force; or (2) effect the arrest or to prevent the
escape from custody of a person who he reasonably believes is attempting
to escape by means of a deadly weapon, or who indicates an imminent
threat of death or serious physical injury to others; or (3) prevent the
escape of a person from custody imposed upon him as a result of convic-
tion for a felony.43 A police officer is never authorized to shoot at a
fleeing misdemeanant who does not pose a threat to the life or safety of
others." The North Carolina law probably leaves too much discretion to
the police officer in determining how much force to use and when it is to
be used. As a result, the North Carolina statute is vulnerable to a consti-
tutional challenge.
Some courts have determined that the accidental or negligent shooting
of a person by a police officer is not actionable under section 1983 as a
fourteenth amendment violation.45 Where an accidental or negligent
shooting is involved, there is not the type of intentional, unjustified, un-
provoked, and brutal conduct that the court finds sufficient to constitute
a section 1983 claim.46 The negligent shooting by a police officer consti-
tutes a state tort and a section 1983 violation is not made out unless the
officer's misconduct can be shown to be intentional, unjustified, brutal
and offensive to human dignity.47
D. Illegal Search and Seizure; Invasion of Privacy
Searches and seizures that violate the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments are actionable under section 1983.48 Illegal searches also involve
an invasion of privacy and the deprivation of property without due pro-
cess of law.49
42. Id. at 11.
43. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1988).
44. Sossamon v. Cruse, 133 N.C. 470, 475, 45 S.E. 757, 759 (1903).
45. See Rinker v. County of Napa, 831 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Mills v. Smith, 656
F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1981).
46. Rinker, 831 F.2d at 832.
47. Id.; See also, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (mere negligent conduct may not be
enough to support a § 1983 claim); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1986)
(section 1983 claim upheld when plaintiff alleged an unprovoked assault and battery because police
officers threw him on the ground and kicked him repeatedly).
48. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (allegation of unreasonable search or seizure
in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments satisfies the requirement under section 1979);
Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (the district court erred by not issuing an injunc-
tion prohibiting police from conducting unreasonable searches).
49. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (in holding that the Connecticut
statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was invalid, the Court also recognized that the fourth
12
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The liability of a police officer for conducting an illegal search without
a warrant or exigent circumstance is clearer than the situation presented
when a neutral and detached magistrate issues a facially valid warrant.5"
Generally, a facially valid search warrant authorizes an officer to search
the designated premises. If the warrant is later determined to be invalid,
the officer will be protected by the good faith defense.5" Section 1983
liability does attach if it can be shown that the officer deliberately or
recklessly presented false information to the magistrate to obtain the
search warrant; that the invalidity of the search warrant was apparent
from the face of the warrant even though issued by a magistrate; or that
the magistrate served as a rubber stamp for the conclusory allegations of
the officer and that the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable
cause determination and on the warrant's technical sufficiency is not ob-
jectively reasonable.5 2 If an officer recklessly prepares a search warrant
affidavit, he cannot have an objective good faith reliance on its validity.53
The North Carolina Supreme Court announced in State v. Carter,54
that the "good faith" exception articulated in Leon does not apply under
the North Carolina Constitution or statutes.55 The court reasoned that
North Carolina's exclusionary rule is statutorily based and provides
more protection for North Carolina citizens than does the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.56 As such, the good faith defense
should not be available to police officers in civil rights actions if claims
are raised under the statute or the North Carolina Constitution. Clearly,
there is no basis for a good faith defense under the North Carolina Con-
stitution although the North Carolina Supreme Court has relied on fed-
eral decisions in the past to interpret the substantive protection offered by
article 1, section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution."
By definition, illegal searches and seizures can implicate the state torts
of trespass, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, conversion and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Where facts make out these state
torts, the attorney should incorporate them in the plaintiff's complaint
under the pendant jurisdiction of the court if the complaint is filed in
federal court. The remainder of this section is devoted to a general dis-
cussion of each of these state tort claims.
amendment involves an aspect of privacy); Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3rd Cir. 1974) (right of
privacy recognized); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
50. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1966).
51. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
52. See Leon, 468 U.S. 897.
53. United States v. Boyce, 601 F. Supp. 947, 954 (D. Minn. 1985).
54. 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See e.g., State v. Hyleman, 324 N.C. 506, 379 S.E.2d 830 (1989); State v. Hendricks, 43
N.C. App. 245, 258 S.E.2d 872 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 123, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
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Any unauthorized entry upon the property or land of another, without
legal authorization, constitutes a trespass. 58 The essence of trespass is
the disturbing of the possession of a person's property rights and every
unauthorized entry on the land of another constitutes trespass irrespec-
tive of whether actual damage is done.59
Invasion of privacy has generally been accepted by the North Carolina
courts as tortious conduct. Our courts have not explicitly held that a tort
is committed when a person intentionally intrudes, physically or other-
wise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652 B (1977) does
recognize this offense, and there is no reason to believe that the illegal
entry by a police officer into the home of a citizen or an invasion of the
citizen's person will not be recognized as an invasion of privacy.
Under North Carolina law, an abuse of process consists of the misuse
of the valid process of the law, after it has been issued, to compel a per-
son to do some collateral act not within the normal scope of the process,
or for some purpose of oppression or annoyance. 6  Securing an arrest
warrant to be used as a bargaining tool to obtain a release from civil
liability from a person who has been the target of an illegal search or
seizure is an abuse of process.
Conversion, under North Carolina law, is the unauthorized assump-
tion and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chat-
tels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the
exclusion of the owner's rights.61 The two essential elements in a conver-
sion claim are ownership by the plaintiff and a wrongful conversion by
the defendant.62 It is not necessary to show that the taker possessed a
wrongful intent at the time of the conversion. 63 A police officer can be
liable for conversion since public officials enjoy no special immunity for
unauthorized acts outside their official duty. 6
The intentional infliction of mental distress, a recently recognized
cause of action in North Carolina, arises when a defendant's conduct
exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society and that conduct
causes serious mental distress.65 The Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 46 (1977) makes actionable the reckless infliction of severe emo-
tional distress if bodily harm results from it. In North Carolina, a
58. Academy of Dance Arts, Inc. v. Bates, I N.C. App. 333, 336, 161 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1968).
59. See Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N.C. 281, 283, 69 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1952).
60. See Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 200-01, 254 S.E.2d 611, 624 (1979).
61. Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 264-65, 278 S.E.2d 501, 506 (1981) (quoting Peed v.
Burleson, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439, 94 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956)).
62. Gallimore v. Sink, 27 N.C. App. 65, 67, 218 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1975).
63. Wall v. Colvard, Inc., 268 N.C. 43, 149 S.E.2d 559 (1966).
64. Gallimore, 27 N.C. App. at 68, 218 S.E.2d at 183.
65. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 196, 254 S.E.2d 611, 622 (1979).
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plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defend-
ant, (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe emotional
distress to another.
E. Violations of First Amendment Rights
Conduct by police officers that interferes with the free exercise of
speech, press, association or religion gives rise to causes of action under
section 1983.66 Legal actions involving violations of first amendment
rights are often associated with political and labor demonstrations and
activities. Police officers are supposed to maintain a neutral presence
when faced with unpopular political activities such as labor conflicts or
religious expressions. However, officers often overstep their authority.
The overstepping of police authority is best exemplified in Dellums v.
Powell,67 where police officers used physical force to disrupt anti-war
demonstrations, and in Glasson v. City of Louisville,6" where police of-
ficers prevented the plaintiff from displaying her poster at a public rally
that criticized the President.
Article 1, sections 12 and 14 of the North Carolina Constitution guar-
antees to North Carolina citizens the rights to assemble together to con-
sult for their common good, to petition their grievances against the
government, and to freedom of speech and of the press. Such activities
may be subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions but they
cannot be denied.69
F. Violation of Fifth Amendment and Illegal Interrogation
A section 1983 action is available to a victim who has been forced by
police officers to confess to crimes that he may have committed.7" Such
actions violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition against
self-incrimination secured by fear of physical injury, torture, exhaustion,
or any other type of undue coercion.7
Courts have held that the mere failure to adhere to the dictates of
Miranda v. Arizona,72 does not violate section 1983. The violation of self-
66. See, e.g., Hague v. Commission for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Glasson v. City of
Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that police violated a person's freedom of speech);
Farber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (police officers held liable for violation of first
amendment right of freedom of speech).
67. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
68. 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975).
69. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E.2d 437 (1981); State v. Frinks, 284 N.C.
472, 201 S.E.2d 858 (1974).
70. Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
71. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
72. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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incrimination privileges flows from physical or emotional force or threats
by police officers that force a person to confess.
G. Violation of Fifth and Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Any effort by a police officer that infringes upon the person's right to
counsel is actionable under section 1983. 7" However, the plaintiff must
show actual harm in order to recover.74 Under the fifth and sixth
amendments, the state is obligated to inform a defendant of the right to
counsel and any deliberate effort by an official to deprive a person of this
right is actionable.75
Article 1, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution guarantees
citizens the right to counsel. Unlike the federal right, the right to counsel
in North Carolina is activated as soon as practical after a person is ar-
rested.76 Purposeful conduct by police officers that results in the denial
of the right to counsel to a claimant is actionable through the pendant
jurisdiction of the court.
H. Denial of Right to Medical Attention
Police officers' deliberate denial of necessary medical treatment or the
intentional failure to treat serious medical conditions of incarcerated per-
sons is actionable under section 1983 and is a violation of the eighth
amendment.77 The denial must involve more than negligent malpractice
and rise to the level of deliberate indifference.78
[The] deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners consti-
tutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'. . . proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is mani-
fested by prison doctors ... or by prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the
treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate in-
difference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action
under 1983. This conclusion does not mean, however, that every claim by
a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. An accident, although it may pro-
duce added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as
wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.79
73. See Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. F.B.I., 507 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1974).
74. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
75. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
76. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401 (1988).
77. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
78. Id. at 106.
79. Id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941 (4th Cir.
1987).
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I. Failure to Provide Police Protection
As a general rule, police officers are obligated to provide protection to
citizens against unlawful acts. Courts have held that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the discriminatory
failure to provide police protection on account of race, sex or creed."0 It
is clear that police officers cannot protect every citizen from crime, and
the law does not require such protection even for racial minorities or
women. There is simply no duty owed to the general citizenry to provide
individual police protection.8"
There is, however, a duty to protect a specific individual or class of
persons if a special relationship exists between the injured party and the
police. Where police officers are informed of a particular danger to a
citizen and they fail to respond, a section 1983 claim is raised. For exam-
ple, in Delong v. Erie County,82 the plaintiff called the police emergency
number about physical attacks on her person. The police dispatcher in-
dicated that help would be sent right away, but it never arrived. Subse-
quently, the caller was stabbed to death. Another example is the failure
of police officers to enforce a restraining order against a violent hus-
band.83 In each of these situations, liability against the police officers was
established.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has concluded that merely ac-
quiring a domestic violence order from a district court judge does not
create a special relationship that requires police officers to provide indi-
vidual protection to a person who has been the victim of domestic vio-
lence.8 4  North Carolina General Statute section 50B-5(b) absolves
police officers of liability for their failure to protect holders of domestic
violence orders. Individual police protection is not required by the stat-
ute, and the failure to provide protection does not make out a viable
claim under the Civil Rights Act.8 5
In North Carolina, the general rule is that "ordinarily law enforce-
ment officers have no duty to protect individuals from criminal attack,
their duty being only to the public at large." 86 The general rule is subject
to two time-honored exceptions:
The first ... is based on the special relationship that exists between an
undercover agent, informant or a State's witness and the police when a
person dangerous to the cooperating person is being investigated or pros-
80. See, e.g., Reiff v. City of Philadelphia, 471 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
81. Wright v. City of Ozark, 715 F.2d 1513, 1516 (1lth Cir. 1983).
82. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
83. See, e.g., Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966);
Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983).
84. Braswell v. Braswell, 98 N.C. App. 231, 236, 390 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1990).
85. See, Id. at 236-37, 390 S.E.2d at 755-56.
86. Id. at 235, 390 S.E.2d at 754.
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ecuted. The other exception, a 'special relationship' exception of another
type, arises when (1) police protection is promised to an individual; (2)
the protection is not forthcoming; and (3) the individual's reliance on the
promise of protection is causally related to the injury suffered. This ex-
ception to the general rule was adopted because it is unjust to deny re-
dress when a victim of violence is lulled into not taking steps for his or
her own safety by voluntary assurances of protection by the police.
8 7
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held in Braswell v. Braswell,"8
that a prima facie case was established where sheriff deputies promised a
domestic violence victim that she would be protected from her husband
while she went back and forth to work and travelled around town. The
wife relied upon these promises but was killed by her husband, a deputy
sheriff, when deputies failed to provide the anticipated protection.8 9
In White v. Rochford,9° the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that a section 1983 claim was stated where police officers deliber-
ately left the plaintiff's young children in a car along a highway after the
plaintiff was arrested for drag racing. The circuit court held that the
officers had a special duty to protect the children, and that the failure to
properly assist them caused the children extreme physical discomfort and
fear for their safety and thereby violated the children's due process
rights.91 The court concluded that the callous treatment by the police
officers "shocked the conscience" of the court.92
Statistical evidence showing a disproportionately low rate of arrests in
domestic assault cases has been held to state a section 1983 claim against
a police department. Because the police department established a policy
that persons who physically abused their spouses would be arrested only
as a last resort, the victim stated an actionable claim of a "policy or
custom" that discriminated against domestic violence victims. 93 The ap-
plicable standard to be considered in a failure to protect action is whether
the intentional acts of a police officer put a particular person in danger
and thus make it necessary to protect that person from any incremental
risk of harm. The failure to protect under this circumstance constitutes a
due process violation. The Due Process Clause does not impose an af-
firmative duty on the state to protect persons who are not in state cus-
tody from harm by third parties.94
Citizens who are peacefully engaged in protest activities are owed a
87. Id.; see also, Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2, disc. rev. denied, 322
N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988).
88. 98 N.C. App. 231, 235, 390 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1990).
89. Id. at 235, 390 S.E.2d at 755.
90. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
91. Id. at 383.
92. Id. at 385.
93. See Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
94. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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duty of protection as long as they are not in violation of the law.95 "One
charged with the duty of keeping the peace... must stand on the side of
law and order or be counted among the mob." 96
J. Other Claims
Other claims are possible under section 1983 as long as the attorney
can show a substantial constitutional violation. Claims of harassment or
verbal abuse have been held to be actionable if the offending conduct is
based on the person's sex, race, ethnic background or sexual orienta-
tion.97 Psychological or mental abuse committed by a governmental offi-
cial have been held to be actionable under section 1983.98 The acts of
police officers who forced a plaintiff to undress, took photographs of her
in indecent positions and then circulated the pictures to other officers
violated the plaintiff's right of privacy. 99 Unjustified and unreasonable
strip searches also violate the right of privacy and should be vigorously
pursued under section 1983.100
V. ESTABLISHMENT OF LIABILITY
A. Individual Liability
All officers who, under the color of state law, commit an act which
results in a constitutional deprivation are liable for damages under sec-
tion 1983. Other officers who are present when the violation occurs, but
merely stand by and watch, are also liable because police officers have an
affirmative duty to protect citizens from violators of the law. 0 Govern-
mental officers who stand idly by while private citizens are illegally at-
tacked by others are also liable under section 1983 for not protecting the
95. See Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, (6th Cir. 1975) (case involved a policeman
who destroyed a sign held by a person protesting on a route to be traveled by the President's motor-
cade; the police were liable for violation of protestor's first amendment rights); see also Downie v.
Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951) (willful or purposeful failure of the police to keep order and
peace and protect right to peacefully assemble amounted to police acquiescence in the mob's action).
96. See Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1951); accord Belknap v. Leary, 427
F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970) (New York construction workers attack anti-war demonstrators); see also
Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (demonstrators, peacefully marching along
a public highway in Alabama in protest of discriminatory voter registration, were attacked rather
than protected by police officers).
97. See Carter v. Cuyler, 415 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450
(9th Cir. 1963).
98. See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1978).
99. York, 324 F.2d at 452.
100. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (the court stated a person
should not be subject to a strip search for drugs unless the authorities have a reasonable factual basis
to believe the person was in possession of drugs).
101. See Ware v. Reed, 709 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1983).
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plaintiff's rights.'
42 U.S.C. § § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.' 0 3
B. Supervisory Officials
The respondeat superior doctrine does not apply to section 1983
claims when monetary damages are sought."° To be liable under section
1983, supervisory officials must be personal participants in the wrongful
acts directed against a plaintiff. The supervisory official need not be on
the scene at the time of the incident, but if he contributed to the act by
doing something or by failing to do something, liability can attach.10 5
Section 1983 allows actions against supervisors as long as a sufficient
causal connection is present and the plaintiff is deprived of a federally
secured right under color of law." 6 A section 1983 cause of action
against supervisory personnel exists for the failure to establish proper
procedures or to adequately train or supervise officers when that failure
leads to the deprivation of the person's constitutional rights.'07 The mere
showing by a plaintiff that an individual officer violated a person's consti-
tutional rights on an isolated occasion is not sufficient to raise an issue of
fact as to whether adequate training and procedures were provided. "Su-
pervisors cannot automatically be held liable for a subordinate straying
from the established path.' ' 08
Supervisors can be found liable under section 1983 when they are in a
position of responsibility, knew or should have known of the misconduct,
and yet failed to act to prevent further harm."°9 In order to establish a
supervisory breach, plaintiff must show that the supervising defendant
102. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (liability of prosecutor
who watched police officers beat a prisoner).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 627, (7th Cir. 1979)
(detailed discussion of liability under section 1983).
104. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
105. See Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981).
106. See McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976).
107. Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974).
108. McClelland, 610 F.2d at 697.
109. Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976).
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was adequately put on notice of the officer's prior misbehavior. ° A
plaintiff must show more than "mere negligence" in the failure of the
supervisor to train the officers in order to recover under section 1983.111
To be liable, a supervisor must demonstrate at least gross negligence
amounting to deliberate indifference, and this conduct must be causally
linked to the subordinate's violation of the plaintiff's rights." 2 The issue
is whether the supervisor caused the constitutional violation to be com-
mitted by the subordinate officer and not whether the supervisor partici-
pated directly in the unconstitutional act of the subordinate.'
3
Supervisory liability is clearly recognized under the following facts:
1. The supervisor is present on the scene or in some manner directs
the actions of officers on the scene.'
14
2. The supervisor acquiesces in the unlawful behavior of the
subordinates. " 5
3. The supervisor has failed to properly train subordinates." 6
4. The supervisor knew of problems, but failed to correct them or to
supervise subordinates. "7
5. The supervisor violated a statutory duty which permitted the
violation.' 18
C. Municipalities
The landmark decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services"'
authorized actions against municipal defendants. The Court in Monell
concluded that when a municipal policy is the cause of unconstitutional
actions taken by municipal employees, the municipality can be held liable
under section 1983.120 "Liability will exist where the unconstitutional
action 'implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated' by municipal officers, or
where the constitutional deprivation is visited pursuant to governmental
'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal
110. McClelland, 610 F.2d at 697.
111. Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 820 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
112. Id. at 820.
113. McClelland, 610 F.2d at 696.
114. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (police chief held liable for first
amendment violations based on his control over and supervision of policemen's conduct); see also
Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981).
116. See Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974).
117. See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1980).
118. See Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
119. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
120. Id. at 694.
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approval.'121
Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
persons under section 1983 and may not be sued for depriving a citizen of
constitutional or statutory rights while acting under color of law. The
United States Supreme Court concluded that Congress' intent to provide
a remedy to citizens for deprivations caused by the state differs from the
ability to hold a municipality and its officials liable for civil rights
violations.
Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of
civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who
seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.
The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its
immunity,. .. or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power
under [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override that
immunity. 1
22
A policy or custom need not be made by the city's lawmakers, but can
be set "by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent offi-
cial policy.' 23 If the conduct of the municipality is the cause of the
action against the plaintiff, liability attaches.1 24
In Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 25 the United States Supreme
Court held that qualified immunity could not protect a municipality and
municipal defendants would be liable for constitutional violations even
where the actions complained of were taken in good faith. The Supreme
Court declared in Owens:
[t]he knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its injurious
conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, should create an incen-
tive for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their
intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional
rights. Furthermore, the threat that damages might be levied against the
city may encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal
rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional
infringements on constitutional rights. Such procedures are particularly
beneficial in preventing those 'systemic' injuries that result not so much
from the conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive behav-
ior of several government officials, each of whom may be acting in good
faith. 126
In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,127 the Supreme Court made clear
that a municipality can be liable under section 1983 for a single wrongful
121. Avery & Rudosky, Police Misconduct Law and Litigation, § 3.5(a), at 3-28 (1990).
122. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1990).
123. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
124. Id. at 692.
125. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
126. Id. at 651-52.
127. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
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act as long as the act results from a decision by municipal policymakers
as well as by duly elected officials.
The power to establish policy is no more the exclusive province of the
legislature at the local level than at the state or national level. Monell's
language makes clear that it expressly envisioned other officials "whose
acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy" [cite omit-
ted], and whose decisions therefore may give rise to municipal liability
under [section] 1983... If the decision to adopt that particular course of
action is properly made by that government's authorized decision mak-
ers, it surely represents an act of official government "policy" as that
term is commonly understood. More importantly, where action is di-
rected by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is
equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be
taken repeatedly. To deny compensation to the victim would therefore
be contrary to the fundamental purpose of [section] 1983.128
The decision makers referred to in Pembaur were those persons who
possessed final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action ordered, thus every decision by a municipal executive subjects the
municipality to section 1983 liability. 12 9 "The official must also be re-
sponsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity
before the municipality can be held liable."' 3a Municipal liability at-
taches "where a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made
from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for
establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in
question."131
Courts have held that municipalities can be held liable in the following
situations:
1. The municipality has enacted an unconstitutional statute that re-
sults in the violation of the plaintiff's rights.
32
2. The municipality has established an affirmative policy that vio-
lates the plaintiff's rights.'33
3. The municipality has impliedly or tacitly authorized, approved,
or encouraged the harassment of the plaintiff. 3
4. The municipality has failed to correct unconstitutional condi-
128. Id. at 480.
129. Id. at 481-83.
130. Id. at 482-83.
131. Id. at 483-84.
132. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. City of Chicago Heights, 480 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
133. Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1984) (the strip searches of
women who were arrested on misdemeanor charges pursuant to established city policy was held to
be violative of the plaintiff's rights).
134. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980) (insufficient evidence to prove "offi-
cial policy" resulted in reversal for City).
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tions and has tolerated a pattern and practice of misconduct so
widespread that it may be considered the unofficial custom or
policy of the city to engage in the misconduct in question. 3 '
5. The municipality has failed to properly train and supervise its
officers. 136
The inadequacy of police training can serve as the basis for municipal
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the failure to train amounts to a delib-
erate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come
into contact and the deficiency identified in the municipality's training
program is closely related to the ultimate injury incurred. 137  "Only
where [the] failure to train reflects a 'deliberate' or 'conscious' choice by
a municipality . . . can a city be liable for such a failure under section
1983." t31 North Carolina General Statute section 17C-10 requires all
law enforcement personnel in North Carolina to satisfy specific training
standards in order to remain employed as a police officer. 139 The munici-
pality can not be held liable for the mere negligent hiring of a police
officer unless the employment process rises to the level of gross
negligence. 140
VI. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. General Consideration
A police officer is protected by qualified immunity if he can show that
his otherwise unlawful conduct did not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonably competent police of-
ficer would have known. 4 ' As interpreted by the Court, the qualified
immunity defense provides protection to all but the plainly incompetent
officers or those who knowingly violate the law. 42 To be entitled to good
faith or qualified immunity, the officer must have acted in an objectively
135. Thomas v. City of New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1982) (the court affirmed liability
against the municipality in a suit by a police officer who was wrongfully fired for violating an unoffi-
cial but standard code of silence).
136. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (the inadequacy of police training
can serve as the basis for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See also Tuttle v. City of
Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1984); Chestnut v. City of Quincy, 513 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.
1975).
137. Harris, 489 U.S. at 387.
138. Id. at 389.
139. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17C-10 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Stokes v. Bullins, 844 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (failure of city to fully investigate
police applicants' arrest history and background did not amount to gross negligence or conscious
indifference to public welfare).
141. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard applies
for official acts and discretionary acts).
142. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (officer will not be immune unless there is a
reasonable objective basis for an arrest warrant).
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reasonable manner. 143
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must
be pleaded by a defendant official."4 If not raised by a defendant, the
defense is lost. The plaintiff need not allege in the complaint that the
defendant was acting in "bad faith" when the wrongful conduct was
committed. The burden of proving the existence of good faith rests with
the defendant. '45
[T]he judge appropriately may determine, not only the current applicable
law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action
occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal develop-
ments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct
not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was
clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a
reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims ex-
traordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor
should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be
sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective
factors. 1
46
B. Fourth Amendment Considerations
In the fourth amendment context, the Supreme Court established that
good faith immunity protects a police officer who conducts a search or
makes an arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant that is later deter-
mined to be defective. 147 The fourth amendment "good faith" immunity
defense was incorporated into civil rights actions in Malley v. Briggs,t4
8
where the court announced:
As the qualified immunity has evolved, it provides ample protection to all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law...
Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that
no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant
should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on
this issue, immunity should be recognized.t 49
143. See, e.g., United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1987) (motion to suppress
upheld).
144. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
145. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (private parties jointly engaged with
public officials are not entitled to judicial immunity).
146. 457 U.S. at 818-19.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (exclusionary rule should not apply to
evidence found while searching pursuant to a facially valid warrant).
148. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
149. Id. at 341.
1991]
25
Joyner: Litigating Police Misconduct Claims in North Carolina
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1991
138 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:113
[I]t would be incongruous to test police behavior by the "objective rea-
sonableness" standard in a suppression hearing, (cite omitted), while ex-
empting police conduct in applying for an arrest or search warrant from
any scrutiny whatsoever in a [section 1983] damages action .... 150
A reasonably competent police officer is expected "to have a reason-
able knowledge of what the law prohibits."'' Implicit in the Court's
reasoning is the requirement that an officer receive some training in order
to know the law, but they are not expected to know more than the magis-
trate who issues the warrant. 1 52
The officer who searches or arrests pursuant to a facially valid warrant
will be protected by the "good faith" defense unless:
1. The officer knowingly or recklessly used false evidence to obtain
the warrant.'
53
2. The magistrate abandoned his neutral and detached role and
served as a rubber stamp for the police.15 4
3. The officer's search or arrest exceeds the scope of the warrant's
authorization.' 55
The "good faith" exception is never available if the police "officers
were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable
cause."' 56 A police "officer... cannot excuse his own default by point-
ing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate." 157
In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magis-
trate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the
warrant is technically sufficient. "[O]nce the warrant issues, there is lit-
erally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the
law".. .. Nevertheless, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-
cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he
issues must be objectively reasonable . . .and it is clear that in some
circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing
that the warrant was properly issued.' 58
The mere existence of a search warrant is not fatal to a section 1983
claim and illegal conduct by a police officer should still be challenged. A
good faith immunity defense is not necessarily fatal to a section 1983
150. Id. at 344.
151. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.20.
152. Id. at 912 n.9.
153. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
154. Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
155. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
156. Id. at 926.
157. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 346 n.9 (1986).
158. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921-23 (citation omitted).
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claim for illegal search or arrest but the case is certainly complicated by
it.
It is refreshing to know that the North Carolina Supreme Court has
refused to recognize the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
under the state constitution and statute.' 5 9 State v. Carter involved an
illegal search conducted pursuant to a non-testimonial identification or-
der for an in-custody defendant rather than upon a properly issued
search warrant. Whether this rejection of the "good faith" exception will
be incorporated into civil rights actions brought under the state constitu-
tion is an open question.
C. Procedural Considerations
The more significant problem with "good faith immunity" as applied
to civil rights actions is the procedural hurdles that lie in the path of the
plaintiff's attorney. "Good faith" immunity is really treated as a bar to
suit rather than as a mere affirmative defense to be resolved at trial.
In Mitchell v. Forsyth,' I the Court concluded that good faith immu-
nity entitled the officer "not to stand trial or [to] face the other burdens
of litigation," '' if the officer did not violate clearly established law. This
entitlement, the court declared, is "lost if a case is erroneously permitted
to go to trial."' 62
Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly estab-
lished law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismis-
sal before the commencement of discovery. Even if the plaintiff's
complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly
established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discov-
ery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to
whether the defendant in fact committed those acts.E63
If the defendant's claim of good faith immunity is lost at any stage of
the proceeding, an appeal of right to the court of appeals and the United
States Supreme Court is available to the defendant. The good faith de-
fense can be asserted in a motion to dismiss on the pleading,' 6 in a mo-
tion for summary judgment, t 65 or even after the plaintiff has been
granted a judgment as to liability.' 66
The effect of the entitlement not to go to trial and the immediate ap-
pealability of the denial of the good faith defense is to allow defendant
159. See State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).
160. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
161. Id. at 526.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
165. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
166. Stevens v. Corbell, 798 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1986).
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officers to draw out police misconduct litigation for years. Police mis-
conduct actions can simply be "piece-mealed to death" by repeated ap-
peal through the appellate process before a plaintiff can get to trial.' 67
The cost in time and expenses will be enormous to the plaintiff.
VII. DAMAGES
The calculation or estimation of damages in a section 1983 action is
always difficult. This is especially true when an attorney is confronted
with constitutional violations which are not accompanied by treatable or
articulable physical injuries. The better practice is to plead damages in
excess of $10,000 and attempt to present the violations to the jury in the
most egregious manner possible.
Damages available to the plaintiff are:
1. Compensatory damages which are designed to provide fair and rea-
sonable compensation for loss, harm, or injury suffered.
2. Nominal damages which are awarded where a constitutional viola-
tion occurs but no measurable monetary damages can be proven.
3. Special damages which compensate the victim for specific pecuniary
losses.
4. Medical expenses to compensate for the reasonable value of the cost
of treatment.
5. General damages for the pain and suffering experienced by the vic-
tim. Included are damages for physical pain, discomfort, loss of use
of bodily function, disfigurement, and psychological injuries includ-
ing stigma, humiliation, fright, and emotional trauma.
6. Punitive or exemplary damages against individual defendants are au-
thorized to punish the defendant for outrageous conduct. Munici-
palities, however, are immune from punitive damage awards.' 68
VIII. ATTORNEY'S FEES
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) provides, in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (citation omitted), the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award bestows upon the prevailing
party in specified civil rights actions, usually the plaintiff, a statutory eli-
gibility to a discretionary award of attorney fees. Section 1988, as
167. See Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164 (lst Cir. 1986), overruled, Unwin v. Campbell 863 F.2d
124, 132 (lst Cir. 1988).
168. City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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amended, allows reasonable attorney fees in any action or proceeding to
enforce the provisions of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986.169
The attorney's fee entitlement of section 1988 is designed to attract
competent counsel to represent citizens deprived of their civil rights."' 0
In many respects the award of attorney fees can be more significant than
the award of damages to the victim in a civil rights case. In Rivera v.
City of Riverside,'7' the city was ordered to pay victorious civil rights
plaintiffs $245,456.25 in attorney fees following a trial in which the plain-
tiffs recovered a total of $33,350 in damages. In Cunningham v. City of
McKeesport,'72 the city was ordered to pay $35,000 in attorney fees in a
case in which judgment for the plaintiff was entered in the amount of
$17,000. In another case, Copeland v. Marshall,"7 3 $160,000 in attorney
fees was awarded for obtaining a $33,000 judgment for the plaintiff. In
Skoda v. Fontani, 7 4 an attorney's fee award of $6,068.12 was ordered
where the plaintiff recovered $1.00.
The Supreme Court made it clear in North Carolina Department of
Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council,175 that the legislative
history of section 1988 envisioned the award of attorney fees only for
proceedings that were part of or followed by a lawsuit. Parties who
merely use administrative proceedings to secure rights protected by the
statutes enumerated in section 1988 or the Constitution are not entitled
to an attorney's fees award and may not bring a separate action for that
purpose. 1
76
Attorney fees are available only to the prevailing party. A prevailing
party is one who obtains favorable relief by way of jury verdict or judg-
ment or by a settlement of the claim outside of court but after an action
has been filed. Attorney fees are not dependent upon whether the plain-
tiff prevailed on the "central issue" in the case as long as the plaintiff
prevails on "any significant issue" that materially alters the legal rela-
tionship between the parties. 77 Attorney's fees are also available where
the prevailing party obtains injunctive relief that causes the defendant to
change its policies or procedures, 78  where pendente lite relief is
granted, 79 or where the substantial rights of the parties have been deter-
169. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 n.19 (1986).
170. Id.
171. 763 F.2d 1580 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
172. 753 F.2d 262 (3rd Cir. 1985).
173. 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
174. 519 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. I1. 1981).
175. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
176. See also Webb v. Board of Educ., 471 U.S. 234 (1985).
177. Texas State Teachers Assoc. v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989); see also
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
178. Disabled In Action v. Mayor of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1982).
179. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
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mined. A favorable result on a pendant claim, that is part and parcel of a
larger constitutional claim, if the court chose to dispose of the action on
non-constitutional grounds, will also result in an attorney's fees
award.180 Attorney fees are not available where a jury rules against the
plaintiff on the constitutional claims but grants relief only on the pendant
claims. 181
No set formula to determine attorney fees has been established, but a
trial judge can award only an amount that is reasonable in relation to the
results obtained.' 82 To determine the appropriate grant of attorney fees,
courts generally utilize the twelve factor test articulated in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc.."3 These factors are:
(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions, (3) the skill requisite to properly perform the legal service, (4) the
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7)
time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation,
and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and
(12) awards in similar cases. The legislative history also states that attor-
neys' fees should not be reduced because the rights involved may be non-
pecuniary in nature.' 
84
Attorney fees are recoverable when actions are brought in either the
federal or state courts,185 if the action is pursuant to the enumerated civil
rights sections specified in section 1988. Attorney fees are recoverable
against the state and the federal government and are not barred by the
states' immunity to Suit.186
The plaintiff may be obligated to pay the defendant's attorney's fees
where the litigation is found to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation. 87 Attorneys should carefully screen each case to determine
if there is a factual basis for the action. Carefully screening the case
obviously involves some investigation to confirm the critical allegations
made by the plaintiff and thorough research of the legal basis for the
action. Merely losing a section 1983 case does not subject the plaintiff to
a court order requiring the payment of the defendant's attorney fees.
The plaintiff's attorney must keep meticulous records of the time spent
on the case and the out-of-pocket expenses incurred during the litigation.
180. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1983).
181. Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1981).
182. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
183. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
184. Id. at 717-19.
185. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
186. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
187. Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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The attorney should not be afraid to record and claim every minute used
on the case including the preparation of letters; conferences with clients
or witnesses; telephone conversations with parties, opposing attorneys,
paralegals or student researchers; and the search for witnesses or other
sources of evidence. In determining attorney's fees, the court is required
to make a detailed finding of fact that explains the method used to com-
pute the attorney fee award. Appropriate factors, as set out in John-
son,1 88 must be considered and articulated.
IX OTHER LITIGATION CONCERNS
The litigation of police misconduct claims is a tedious but rewarding
enterprise. These cases take time, patience, energy and some money.
The attorney should choose his cases carefully; if not, burnout occurs
early on in the legal career. Bad case choices can also be very costly to
the attorney.
The cost of police misconduct litigation is of paramount concern to all
attorneys. In most cases, the victim will be unable or unwilling to pay
litigation expenses and most victims cannot afford to pay attorney's fees.
The attorney, therefore, should be prepared to "front" the litigation
costs. The inability to "front" the costs causes many attorneys to refuse
to accept police misconduct cases. This problem can be minimized by
associating with another attorney and sharing the litigation costs.
If possible, the attorney should attempt to obtain an "advance" from
the client to cover the initial litigation costs, i.e. filing fee, and deposi-
tions. Clients who invest in their cases are more interested in working
with the attorney in the investigation and preparation of the case.
The attorney should always engage in an open and frank discussion
with the client about litigation costs. Clients should be encouraged to
contribute to the cost of the litigation and a payment plan should be
arranged. The simple problem is that too often the client will be poor
and unable to pay anything. Where finances are a real problem, the at-
torney should be reluctant not to associate another attorney in the case.
Once you are the attorney of record in the case, it is difficult to withdraw
from it. An innovative attorney can minimize some of the costs associ-
ated with investigation and discovery, however.
One method of reducing costs is to maximize the use of interrogatories
and requests for the production of documents and other items of evi-
dence under Rules 33 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Interrogatories may be a less effective discovery device than the taking of
depositions but you don't have to pay a court reporter or be personally
present when the defendants are answering the questions. One may pre-
188. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19.
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pare and serve a first set of interrogatories on the defendant(s) along with
the complaint. Non-party witnesses can be interviewed rather than de-
posed; by doing so, plaintiff's attorney may be able to hide a witness or
two from the defendant.
Another cost cutting technique is for the plaintiff's attorney to tape-
record depositions rather than to order a transcript from a certified court
reporter. There are certainly disadvantages, but those are not fatal since
the court file in federal court will have a transcribed copy of the deposi-
tions anyway. Let the defense depose the witnesses and you can "piggy-
back" on the insurance company's "deep pockets." A different situation
exists in North Carolina because depositions are not filed and kept by the
court. Yet it is still cheaper to obtain a copy of the original deposition
and to duplicate it at a commercial facility or at the attorney's office.
A. State or Federal Court
There is no reason to avoid the litigation of civil rights cases in the
state forum. This is particularly true in North Carolina where the qual-
ity of judges has improved tremendously over the years and the court has
become more philosophically amenable to civil rights claims. The state
court's record in civil rights cases has not been extensive because litigants
automatically file their actions in federal court and deny the state court
the opportunity to apply North Carolina law and procedures.
The discovery rules in state court are now very similar, if not identical,
to the rules in federal court. Thus, there is no significant advantage
gained by utilizing the federal rather than the state forum. In light of
changes in the local federal rules regarding discovery, the state discovery
rules in many instances may be more advantageous.
In the state forum, the plaintiff is not out of court if the constitutional
claims are not proven. State law claims in the federal forum are brought
under the pendant jurisdiction of the court. In the federal forum, if the
plaintiff is unsuccessful on the constitutional claims, the pendant claims
are lost even if the jury returns a verdict in plaintiff's favor. This result
can be avoided in the state forum where state tort claims can be sepa-
rately litigated.
It is true that federal judges have more experience with civil rights
claims than do state court judges. However, this does not mean that
federal judges are necessarily more receptive to civil rights claims. Many
people have lost civil rights cases because antagonistic federal judges
have misread or misapplied the law.' 89
The substantive law in state court is probably better in North Carolina
189. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See also Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) This comment is not directed at the quality of the federal court
judges in North Carolina who have issued some major civil rights decisions over the years.
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where the court has refused to endorse the "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule in fourth amendment cases. "Good faith" immunity is
a major hurdle for a civil rights claimant to counter in court. Not having
to deal with the "good faith" defense will make litigation easier and less
expensive. This statement is predicated upon the view that the North
Carolina court will not apply the "good faith" defense in civil rights
cases.
For a long time it was felt that North Carolina jurors would not be
receptive to civil rights claims. This is not a real concern because you get
North Carolina jurors in federal court also. In fact, state law allows for a
broader selection of persons to serve on jury panels in state court than
are available in federal court. There is a better racial mix among jurors
in state court, particularly in eastern North Carolina, than you have in
federal court. It is more likely that jurors from a particular county will
be more familiar with the tendencies of local police departments. This
familiarity cuts both ways, however. A big advantage in state court is
that the attorney is able to question each propective juror as to their
ability and willingness to be fair to the civil rights plaintiff.
The North Carolina courts should be challenged to develop their own
extensive civil rights record and philosophy. The minimum protection
has already been established by the federal court interpretation of the
Constitution and federal Civil Rights Laws. In some instances, those
protections are not adequate and state law and the North Carolina Con-
stitution must be relied upon to maximize the protection that citizens
have against police misconduct.
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